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Experimenta b s t r a c t
We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information
aggregation in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how
subjects respond to new information, in the form of both privately observed signals and
signals reported from others. We find that a considerable number of subjects exhibit
‘reverse confirmation bias’: they place less weight on information from others that agrees
with their private signal and more weight on conflicting information. We also find a
striking degree of consensus when subjects make decisions on behalf of the group under
a random dictatorship procedure. Reverse confirmation bias and the incidence of consensus
are considerably reduced when group members can share signals but not communicate.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
One of the key functions of deliberating groups is the bringing together of people who have independently obtained infor-
mation on a common risk. When such groups effectively aggregate information from different members, this allows the
members to respond better to the risk. But is this a faithful representation of how people share and process information
in groups? How do people actually use information received from others? We present a controlled laboratory experiment
that investigates this question with respect to decisions under risk over monetary earnings.
Previous economic experiments on group decision-making under risk show that when all members of a group have the
same probabilistic information, group decisions often differ from what group members would have decided individually. We
extend this literature by focusing on an experimental setting where each group member has private prior information about
a common risk. In such a setting individual group members can benefit from updating these priors using information
conveyed through group interaction. Previous research has shown that individuals often update priors in a way that ison).
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ogy documents important group effects in the way individuals process information obtained from group deliberation
(e.g. Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Stoner, 1961). An important distinction between our design and this literature is that
we introduce heterogeneous information in a controlled fashion. In a controlled laboratory environment, we investigate
(i) how private information is aggregated to influence individual decisions and (ii) how an individual decides on behalf of
a group.
The experiment is divided into four stages. In each stage, subjects make an investment decision whose outcome depends
on a binary state of the world variable. In stage I subjects make individual decisions knowing that both states are equally
likely ex ante. At the beginning of stage II subjects receive a private signal about the state of the world, and then make
another individual decision. At the beginning of stage III we randomly form groups in which subjects can share their private
information with two others, and then a single decision is made for the group by a randomly selected group-member. How
the group interaction in stage III proceeds depends on the treatment. In our COMM treatment, subjects communicate with
fellow group members through unrestricted free-form electronic chat; in our NO-COMM treatment, subjects interact only by
reporting their private signals to fellow group members. Finally, in stage IV subjects make decisions based on the same infor-
mation they had in stage III, but this time a subject’s decision is a purely individual decision, i.e. it is not observed by other
subjects and it cannot affect their payoffs.
Controlling for the probabilistic information that subjects receive in various stages allows us to measure how strongly
subjects’ preferred choice under risk responds to this information. We are particularly interested in whether subjects’
response depends on the source of information: a privately observed signal or information provided by a fellow group
member. Comparing decisions in stages I and II allows us to observe how subjects react to privately observed signals, while
comparing individual choices from stages II and IV allow us to examine how subjects respond to information received from
others.
Finally, choices from stages III and IV allow us to compare choices on behalf of the group with choices on behalf of oneself.
In stage III, when subjects decide on behalf of their group, we do not force them to reach a consensus with others. Instead, we
use a random dictatorship procedure, which incentivizes subjects to reveal their own preferred level of risk-taking for the
group. This procedure delivers easily interpretable ‘‘group choices” made by individual subjects and has the advantage of
eliminating strategic considerations associated with other group decision-making processes.1
We find that subjects generally respond intuitively to information they receive privately. Subjects also readily share their
signals with their group – there is no systematic evidence of strategic reporting. We cannot reject the hypothesis that many
of our subjects act in line with rational Bayesian updating. Note that with Bayesian updating we refer here to the joint
hypothesis of fully trusting signals reported by other players and using this information to update one’s priors. For subjects
who receive two conflicting signals from fellow group members, we find that about half of subjects leaves their decision
under risk unchanged. This is in line with taking the reports at face value and updating subjective beliefs using Bayes’ rule.
However, the other half of the subjects who receive two conflicting signals change their decision. This may reflect a violation
of rational Bayesian updating or it may reflect a mistrust in the signal reports of others. Interestingly, when subjects can
freely communicate (treatment COMM), we see a systematic bias towards changing one’s decision away from the direction
predicted by their private signal. We refer to this behavior as ‘reverse confirmation bias’. Without free-form communication
(treatment NO-COMM), changes are equally likely to occur in either direction.
We also find treatment differences in the group decision-making stage. In the COMM treatment, the majority of the
subjects make the same decision as fellow group members. This degree of consensus is remarkable given the absence
of any monetary or reputational incentives for reaching consensus. In the final stage, approximately half of the subjects
make the same choice that they made in the group-decision making stage. This pattern of decisions is consistent with
the explanation of consensus at the group stage as driven by persuasive arguments by peer subjects. However, given
that half of the subjects make different choices in these stages we cannot exclude that social preferences over risk play
a role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we review related studies in psychology and
economics. In Section 3 we describe our experiment and in Section 4 we present our results. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Related literature
2.1. Information aggregation
Both economists and psychologists have investigated the question of how groups aggregate information. Theories of
information aggregation go back at least as far as the famous jury theorem of Condorcet (1785). Recent theoretical contri-
butions to the literature on committee voting by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
show that incentives to vote strategically can lead to group members voting against their private information, thus1 Our random dictatorship procedure may also reduce the disproportionate influence of group members with particular risk preferences or personalities that
is found in other studies. Ertac and Gurdal (2012) find that men who express a preference to be a group leader (decide on behalf of a group) are more risk
seeking than men who do not. Nieboer (2015) reports that all-female groups do not take more risk than female individuals whereas all-male groups take
significantly more risk than male individuals when groups decide by consensus.
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Goeree, Kartik, & Palfrey, 2008; Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, & Palfrey, 2000), although this is less of a concern when group mem-
bers can communicate (Goeree & Yariv, 2011).
Experimental evidence from social psychology suggests that group interaction often leads to decisions that are extreme
compared to the preferences of individual group members. Group interaction may produce choice shifts (Stoner, 1961) or
group polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). The way in which groups aggregate information, specifically the
persuasiveness of certain arguments, can play an important role in this process (Vinokur & Burstein, 1974). More recently,
Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) and Sobel (2014) theoretically investigate the group polarization phenomenon in the
framework of Bayesian rationality, demonstrating that both Bayesian and non-Bayesian rational behavior can explain
extreme outcomes in groups. These approaches have the advantage that they quantify the strength (in probabilistic terms)
of pieces of information, which allows for precise predictions of behavior. Our experiment also follows this approach.
Bayesian-rational models of group interaction like Sobel’s (2014) typically assume that groups efficiently aggregate prob-
abilistic information held by their members, but, as argued by Glaeser and Sunstein (2009), this assumption may often not be
warranted. There is indeed experimental evidence suggesting that groups are better than individuals at using probabilistic
information when the group receives this information exogenously as a collective (see Blinder & Morgan, 2005; Charness,
Karni, & Levin, 2007).3 But, outside the literature on committee voting discussed earlier, decision-making based on endogenous
information sharing in groups has received little attention. A key question is how people weight information depending on how
they obtained it. McKelvey and Page (1990) present an experiment in which subjects receive private information in the first
round of the experiment, followed by public information with which to update their beliefs in subsequent rounds. Although
subjects do use the public information provided to adjust their beliefs, they are slow to update their beliefs away from their
private information. Given that the experimental design ensures that both types of information have the same strength, private
information is thus relatively overweighted.
One way of interpreting the results of McKelvey and Page is as a manifestation of confirmation bias, the ‘‘seeking or inter-
preting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson, 1998, p.
175). In McKelvey and Page’s experiment, existing beliefs may be shaped by the source of the information (e.g. private versus
public) or by the order in which information is delivered (e.g. earlier versus later). First, evidence from psychology
experiments on information sharing in groups suggests that commonly known information is more persuasive than private
information in group discussions, but that private information is rated more highly if it is known to the decision maker prior
to the discussion instead of learned from a fellow group member (Van Swol, 2007; Van Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). A
second factor is the order in which information is received. Most of the evidence from experiments on probabilistic infor-
mation supports the existence of a primacy effect (in line with confirmation bias): probabilistic information received earlier
has a bigger impact on beliefs than information received later (Hoch, 1984; Peterson & DuCharme, 1967; Pitz, 1969; although
note the opposite recency effect reported in Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). The effect of early information appears to
be stronger when people make a decision after receiving the early information, instead of continuing to parse the informa-
tion (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Finally, groups seem to place the same importance on early information as
individuals do (Mancuso, Finomore, Rahill, Blair, & Funke, 2014; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, and Moscovici (2000)).
2.2. Decisions under risk in social contexts
Our experiment is also related to the experimental literature on decision-making under risk in social contexts, which can
be broadly divided into two strands. First, there is a growing body of laboratory research comparing decisions of groups and
individuals. Results from these experiments suggest that the decisions of groups and individuals often diverge, although the
evidence on direction and nature of the difference is mixed. The experiments of Sutter (2007, 2009) and subsequent repli-
cations show that groups deciding under consensus take more risk than individuals in the investment task introduced by
Gneezy and Potters (1997), whether groups communicate face to face (Nieboer, 2015) or by electronic chat (Bougheas,
Nieboer, & Sefton, 2013). Two experimental studies that also investigate group decision by consensus but use a different
risk-taking task – the multiple price list format introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) – show that group choices are more
extreme than individuals’ at the low end (more safe choices) and high end (more risky choices) of the probability scale
(Baker, Laury, & Williams, 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008). It should be noted that both sets of findings are consistent with
groups making choices more in line with risk neutrality than individuals. Finally, three experimental studies that use a group
voting mechanism and the Holt-Laury task also report mixed results. Masclet, Colombier, Denant-Boemont, and Loheac
(2009) find that groups, deciding by multiple-round unanimous vote, are more risk averse than individuals. Zhang and
Casari (2012) use a communication stage followed by three rounds of unanimous voting; they report that group choices2 This result is reminiscent of the literature on herding and information cascades, in which the decision-maker may also find herself in the position where
publicly received information (through observing others’ actions) overrides her private signal (see Anderson & Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992).
3 Note that groups are ‘better’ than individuals in the sense that they obtain higher pay-offs in a task that rewards them for greater accuracy. Unlike the
investment choice in our experiment, which elicits subjective judgments or preferences, the tasks used by Blinder and Morgan and Charness et al. are purely
intellective – there is an objective correct answer. Experimental evidence on strictly intellective tasks shows that groups perform better than individuals,
provided certain conditions of ‘demonstrability’ are met (Laughlin, 1999; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986).
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vote and find no difference between groups and individuals.
The second strand of experimental literature on decision-making in social contexts suggests that people are often influ-
enced by the choices of their peers. The direction of such peer effects seems to depend on the experimental context. Yechiam,
Druyan, and Ert (2008) report an experiment in which mutual real-time observation between two individuals whilst making
choices under risk leads to higher risk taking. In a multi-period design with feedback on peer choices, Cooper and Rege
(2011) find that subjects are significantly more likely to change their preferred level of risk taking if it deviates from the
majority choice of peers. Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2012) also find evidence of peer effects on binary individual choices under
risk. Finally, Bougheas et al. (2013) report significant convergence in the risk taking of individuals when they are allowed to
freely communicate with each other about an individual decision under risk.
3. The experiment
We begin by describing our experimental design and procedures in Section 3.1, before discussing some key features of
this design and the hypotheses it enables us to address in Section 3.2.
3.1. Experimental design and procedures
All sessions of the experiment were carried out at the CeDEx computer laboratory at the University of Nottingham (Not-
tingham, UK). Subjects were students from various disciplines, who had previously registered for participation in economic
experiments and were recruited via ORSEE recruitment software (Greiner, 2004). Eight sessions were conducted in May
2010, with 84 subjects participating in treatment COMM. In March 2015 we ran a further NO-COMM treatment consisting
of four sessions with 96 subjects.
At the start of a session, subjects were randomly assigned a seat in the laboratory. They then received instructions, which
were also read out loud by an experimenter.4 Subjects were informed that there would be four stages and their earnings would
be based on decisions in one of the four stages, to be picked at random. To make this random selection process completely trans-
parent, the experimenter asked a volunteer subject to publicly perform a double-blind draw from a set of four playing cards
(Ace, Two, Three and Four – shown to all subjects in advance of the draw) and put the selected card in a box in a publicly visible
place. The card was retrieved and displayed to the subjects at the end of the session. Similarly, subjects were informed that
earnings in a stage would depend on which of two states of the world is realized. Again, the experimenter asked a volunteer
to perform a double-blind draw to select one of the states. Specifically, subjects were shown two sets of cards: set A (henceforth
‘the bad state’) consisted of two red Aces of Hearts and one Ace of Spades while set B (henceforth ‘the good state’) consisted of
two Aces of Spades and one Ace of Hearts. The sets were placed in identical packs that were put into an empty bag for selection
by the volunteer subject. At the end of the experiment subjects were shown the entire contents of the selected pack and so
learned whether the state of the world was good or bad.
Subjects then received specific instructions for each stage in turn. Throughout the experiment subjects were not allowed
to communicate with one another, except in Stage III as described below, and all choices were submitted in private via the
software.
In each stage subjects make an investment choice about how much of a £10 endowment to invest. In the bad state the
subject loses her investment and in the good state she gets a positive return. The returns are given in Table 1.5 We thus have
a non-linear version of the investment task introduced in Gneezy and Potters (1997) with a discrete choice set of 11 options.
In stage I subjects choose from the options listed in Table 1, only knowing that the two states of the world are equally
likely to have been selected. The amounts in the table are constructed so that the optimal investment is £5 for a risk-
neutral subject, leaving room for such a subject to increase or decrease her investment as she receives information about
the state of the world.
At the beginning of stage II each subject receives a private signal s e {good, bad}, where Pr{good signal|good state} = Pr
{bad signal|bad state} = 2/3. The signal was thus informative about the true state of the world. This signal was implemented
by allowing each subject to draw a card (with replacement) from the selected set. A draw of a black (red) card corresponds to
receiving a good (bad) signal. Subjects then make another choice from the options listed in Table 1.
Stage III starts with the random formation of groups of three subjects by the experimental software. Subjects are told
about the groups and that they can anonymously interact with the two other group members, although the type of interac-
tion depends on the experimental treatment. In treatment COMM, group members can communicate freely using an elec-
tronic chat box on their screen. During the chat subjects can, if they want, report their individual signals to others in the
group. In treatment NO-COMM, subjects can only report a signal to others – there is no other way of communicating to
others. Subjects are reminded of their private signal and are asked to report a signal to others. They are aware that the soft-
ware will display their reported signal to the others in the group.4 The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experimental instructions are reproduced in Appendix A.
5 In the experiment we used a neutral frame that does not refer to investments, endowments, losses or gains, but simply lists the eleven options and
corresponding earnings. See Appendix A.
Table 1
Investment choices and earnings.
Investment (£) Earnings (£)
Good state Bad state
0 10 10
1 12.80 9
2 15.40 8
3 17.80 7
4 19.60 6
5 20.80 5
6 21.60 4
7 22.40 3
8 22.80 2
9 23.20 1
10 23.60 0
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behalf of the group and are implemented by a ‘random dictatorship’ procedure: in each group one of the group members’
decisions is randomly chosen to be the one that is relevant for all three group members. At the end of this stage all group
members are informed of the three choices and which one is implemented.
In stage IV each subject makes a final investment decision, again by choosing from the options in Table 1. Like the deci-
sions in stages I and II, this is a purely individual decision: it is not observed by other subjects and it only affects the decision-
maker.
At the end of the experiment the state of the world is revealed, the earnings-relevant stage is revealed and subjects are
paid accordingly in private. Average subject earnings for the experiment were £10.29 and the average session time was
40 minutes.
3.2. Hypotheses
3.2.1. Individual decisions
In stage I, subjects make individual investment choices where the state of the world is equally likely to be good or bad.
Choices from this stage thus give us a measure of individual subjects’ willingness to take risk.
In stages II and III, subjects receive information about the true state of the world. In general, after receiving g good signals
and b bad signals, rational Bayesian updating implies that the probability of the good state is given byPrfgood statejb; gg ¼ Prfb; gjgood stateg  Prfgood stateg=Prfb; gg ¼ 1=ð1þ 2bgÞ:
Note that in our design this probability only depends on the difference between the number of bad and good signals. Note
also that the use of this formula implies that all signals are taken at face value (i.e. subjects trust that others report their
signals truthfully).
Thus, Bayesian updating in stage II implies that a subject receiving a good signal updates her subjective probability of the
good state from 1/2 to 2/3, while a subject receiving a bad signal updates her subjective probability of the good state from
1/2 to 1/3. The behavioral prediction in line with Bayesian updating is that subjects who receive a good (bad) signal will keep
constant or increase (decrease) their investment.
In stages III and IV, individuals may use information on private signals obtained from the group interaction in stage III.
Assuming that group members truthfully report their private signal and this is common knowledge, Bayesian updating
implies that the subjective probability that a subject attaches to the good state is given by
Pr{good state|g = 0, b = 3} = 1/9;
Pr{good state|g = 1, b = 2} = 1/3;
Pr{good state|g = 2, b = 1} = 2/3;
Pr{good state|g = 3, b = 0} = 8/9.
We use these probabilities to generate a set of predictions for investment in stage IV (the final individual decision) rel-
ative to stage II. As before, the prediction of decision-making consistent with Bayesian updating is that those subjects for
whom the probability of the good state increases (decreases) will keep constant or increase (decrease) their investment from
stage II to IV.
Note that the probabilities of the good state in groups with mixed signals are the same as the probabilities of the good
state after a single signal: (Pr{good state|g = 0, b = 1} = Pr{good state|g = 1, b = 2} = 1/3, and Pr{good state|g = 1, b = 0} =
Pr{good state|g = 2, b = 1} = 2/3). For two out of three members of such groups, the subjective probability of the good state
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each other out. If subjects were instead prone to confirmation bias, they interpret two conflicting signals in a different way.
According to confirmation bias, a subject places more weight on new evidence that confirms her own signal. As a conse-
quence, a subject with a good (bad) signal who receives conflicting good and bad signal reports from her fellow group mem-
bers will not regard these as cancelling out, but instead will overweight the good (bad) signal report, increase (decrease) her
subjective probability that the state is good and adjust her investment accordingly. Thus, while decision-making consistent
with Bayesian updating does not predict any systematic change of behavior after receiving conflicting signals, confirmation
bias does.6
3.2.2. Group decisions
In stage III, one group member’s decision is randomly selected to be the one that is relevant for all three group members.
Our use of this random dictatorship procedure implies that each group member has an incentive to truthfully reveal her pre-
ferred investment choice for the group. Note that this procedure does not force group members to compromise or reach con-
sensus. Nor does it imply that a subject should make the same decision that she would if she were the only affected party.
However, there are two reasons why consensus might emerge in stage III of our COMM treatment. First, it may reflect that
subjects have other-regarding concerns and prefer compromise rather than forcing their own preferences on others. Second,
subjects may be persuaded by others during discussion that a particular investment choice is actually preferable from an
individual perspective.
To see how far stage III decisions depart from the decision that an individual would make if she were making that decision
in isolation (i.e. when her decision is not observed by others and does not affect others), we also have subjects make indi-
vidual, isolated, decisions in stage IV. Notice that subjects have precisely the same information as in stage III, but their deci-
sion will only affect themselves. If a subject makes different decisions in stages III and IV this suggests that their stage III
decisions reflect some form of social preferences over risk. Another possible effect of group deliberation is persuasion: sub-
jects’ level of risk-taking in stage IV may be influenced by persuasive arguments from fellow group members in stage III, in
which case subjects’ individual decisions in stage IV will be shaped by the decisions made in stage III. Such a result would be
in line with the findings of Sutter (2009), who finds that deciding as part of a group leads subjects to increase their risk taking
compared to individual decisions taken before group membership, without reverting to lower risk taking in individual deci-
sions afterwards.
Notice that there are two differences between stages III and IV of our COMM treatment. One is that subjects make deci-
sions for the group in stage III and for themselves in stage IV. The other is that they communicate freely with other group
members in stage III. Our NO-COMM treatment controls for the effect of communication.
4. Results
4.1. Information and individual investments
We start by looking at decisions from the first two stages, as these provide useful information on heterogeneity in indi-
vidual risk attitudes. For these stages we pool the data from the COMM and NO-COMM treatments.7 Fig. 1 shows the distri-
bution of investment decisions in stage I (upper panel) and stage 2, conditional on the private signal received (two bottom
panels). In stage I, about 20% of subjects make a choice consistent with risk-neutrality and invest £5, and a similar percentage
make an extremely risk averse choice investing nothing to guarantee £10. There is considerable heterogeneity, and the majority
of subjects display risk aversion. In stage II, subjects with good signals tend to invest more than subjects with bad signals, but
again, for both signal types there is considerable heterogeneity.
If we look at how individuals react to their signals we see that the majority of subjects respond in an intuitive way. Fig. 2
shows that subjects tend to increase their investment in response to a good signal or decrease it in response to a bad signal.8
However, a considerable number of subjects do not respond to their private signal. Indeed, 63 of 180 subjects did not change
their investment choice.
Further analysis of how subjects react to new information can be based on comparing stage II and stage IV decisions, since
in stage IV subjects will have new information from the stage III group interaction. Assuming that efficient information
aggregation takes place, i.e. subjects report signals truthfully and believe the reports of others, this new information gives6 As noted earlier, our Bayesian updating predictions assume that subjects believe that others report their signals truthfully. If we relax this assumption by
allowing subjects to distrust all signals by others to some (but the same) extent, we still expect subjects to weight conflicting signals equally. For these subjects,
the prediction consistent with Bayesian updating is that investment in stages II and IV will be the same (e.g. if subjects simply see both signals as ‘cheap talk’
then they should discount both of them entirely). Subjects may also have more sophisticated suspicions, such as distrusting reports of good signals generally
(which means we should see behavior consistent with confirmation bias for those with bad signals and behavior consistent with ‘reverse confirmation bias’ for
those with good signals) or suspicions stemming from communication with specific subjects (in which case predictions are less clear cut).
7 The experimental procedures and instructions are identical up to stage III, and subjects are not given instructions for stage III until after they have
completed stage II. However, a considerable time elapsed between conducting the treatments and so we tested for the legitimacy of pooling. Using two-tailed
Mann–Whitney U tests we fail to find any significant treatment differences between the treatments in these stages: p = 0.5408 (stage I), p = 0.7068 (stage II
conditional on a bad signal) and p = 0.2674 (stage II conditional on a good signal).
8 Only 12 of 180 subjects modified their behavior in the opposite way.
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 2 4 6 8 10
Stage I Investment
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
0 5 10 0 5 10
bad signal good signal
Fr
ac
tio
n
Stage II Investment
Fig. 1. Distributions of individual investments in stages I and II.
0
5
10
0 5 10 0 5 10
bad signal good signal
S
ta
ge
 II
 In
ve
st
m
en
t
Stage I Investment
Fig. 2. Stage I (pre-private signal) versus Stage II (post-private signal) investments.
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allows subjects to misreport or withhold signals, we find that the vast majority of the subjects truthfully report their signals.9
Fig. 3 shows how subjects who received two new identical signals react to this new information. Here we present the data
from the two treatments separately. The picture in both treatments is similar. Subjects receiving two new bad signals should
decrease (or at least not increase) investments relative to stage II, based on a higher posterior probability of the bad state9 In the COMM treatment there is one group where a member claims that there is ‘‘no point discussing what [signals] we got because we all could have
picked the same card” and the others agree. The group proceeds to discuss their decision without considering the signals. In the NO-COMM treatment two
subjects misreported a bad signal. For the remainder of the paper we exclude the three groups concerned, but our results are unaffected if we include these
observations.
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Fig. 3. Stage II (pre-information sharing) versus Stage IV (post-information sharing) investments by subjects receiving two identical signals from others.
S. Bougheas et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 51 (2015) 34–47 41occurring. Only 3 of 27 (COMM) and 3 of 45 (NO-COMM) subjects reacted in a contrarian manner. Analogously, subjects
receiving two new good signals should increase (or at least not decrease) investments. Only 3 of 20 (COMM) and 2 of 13
(NO-COMM) subjects reacted in a contrarian manner. Thus, although we cannot rule out that some subjects discount others’
signals to some extent, the majority of subjects react to new information in an intuitive way.
4.2. Bayesian rationality versus confirmation bias
So far, we have only considered situations in which Bayesian rationality and confirmation bias cannot be separated as
explanations of increasing or decreasing risk-taking across stages of our experiment. But when subjects receive conflicting
signals from their fellow groupmembers, the predictions differ. According to Bayesian updating, a subject receiving one good
and one bad signal should not alter her level of investment. By contrast, confirmation bias stipulates that a signal received
from a fellow groupmember is given more weight if it confirms the subject’s private signal. If those with a good (bad) private
signal increase (decrease) their investment in stage IV relative to stage II, this means that subjects display confirmation bias.
Consistent with Bayesian rationality 14 of 34 (COMM) and 15 of 32 (NO-COMM) subjects make the same choice in stages
II and IV. However, the majority of subjects change their investments. Fig. 4 compares investment decisions for those sub-
jects receiving conflicting signals from their fellow group members, with the left (right) panels showing decisions of subjects
with bad (good) private signals, and the top (bottom) panels showing data from the COMM (NO-COMM) treatments.
In the COMM treatment (top panels), when subjects are allowed to communicate in stage III, we see that those with a bad
private signal tend to increase their investment, whereas in the right panel we see that those with a good private signal tend
to decrease their investment. Of the 20 subjects who change investments, 5 adjust in the direction predicted by confirmation
bias and 15 adjust in the opposite direction. Thus more subjects exhibit reverse confirmation bias than confirmation bias or
Bayesian rationality. The bottom two panels refer to the NO-COMM treatment and show a slightly different picture: 9 sub-
jects adjust in the direction predicted by confirmation bias and 8 in the opposite direction. Thus removing the opportunity to
communicate appears to reduce the incidence of reverse confirmation bias.
For a formal test of whether there is a systematic change in the direction predicted by confirmation bias we measure the
change in investment as the stage IV decision minus the stage II decision for subjects with good signals, and the stage II deci-
sion minus the stage IV decision for subjects with bad signals. Bayesian updating implies that these changes should be zero,
whereas confirmation bias implies positive changes. A two-tailed Mann–Whitney sign-rank test of the pooled data rejects
the hypothesis that the median change is zero for the COMM treatment (n = 34, p = 0.0286), but not for the NO-COMM
treatment (n = 32, p = 0.8497). Thus the deviations from Bayesian rationality are systematic in the COMM treatment, but
evidently this is because there is a tendency for changes away from one’s own signal, i.e. reverse confirmation bias.1010 The test assumes the changes in investment decisions are independent across the subjects who received conflicting signals from others. However, in each
mixed signal group there are two subjects with conflicting signals and it is possible that their decisions in stage IV, after communicating with one another in
stage III, are correlated. Thus we also ran the test for the COMM treatment using the average change for these pairs (i.e. with 17 observations). There is still
systematic evidence of reverse confirmation bias (p = 0.0344).
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Fig. 4. Stage II (pre-information sharing) versus Stage IV (post-information sharing) investments by subjects receiving two conflicting signals from others.
Table 2
Stage III investment decisions.
Number of good signals Average Mean absolute deviation
COMM NO-COMM COMM NO-COMM
0 0.89 0.72 0.30 0.85
(n = 6) (n = 13) (n = 6) (n = 13)
1 1.70 1.83 0.15 1.44
(n = 9) (n = 6) (n = 9) (n = 6)
2 3.17 4.27 0.72 1.44
(n = 8) (n = 10) (n = 8) (n = 10)
3 5.42 5.00 0.56 3.33
(n = 4) (n = 1) (n = 4) (n = 1)
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At the beginning of stage III subjects receive new information about the state of the world from their fellow group mem-
bers. They then make an investment decision and one group member’s choice is randomly selected to implement the group
decision. For each group we calculate the average investment decision and, as a measure of within-group variability in
investment decisions, the mean absolute deviation from the average of the three investment decisions. Table 2 reports
the averages of these measures across groups for each signal profile and treatment.
While the average level of risk-taking increases monotonically with the number of good signals, there is no consistent
treatment effect. Thus, communication does not have a systematic effect on levels of risk-taking. However, within-group
variability is lower in the COMM treatment for any signal profile.11 The low within-group variability in the COMM treatment
is due to a striking degree of consensus within groups. Indeed, in 14 out of 27 groups all three group members submitted an
identical decision. By comparison, in the NO-COMM treatment consensus was observed in only 6 of 30 groups.
Communication may lead to consensus in group decision making via two alternative mechanisms. First, decisions may
reflect social preferences over risk, whereby subjects make choices that they would not make in an individual decision-
making context. For example, subjects may prefer to conform, driven by pressure from peers or a concern for the risk
preferences of other group members. Second, decisions may be the result of persuasive arguments, whereby subjects are
influenced by the group discussion and may reflect an agreement on what is the preferable option. By examining decisions
in stage IV we can examine the influence of these two mechanisms. If consensus in stage III decisions only reflects social11 For statistical treatment comparisons we use two-tailed Mann–Whitney U tests using the group as the unit of observation. Note that some of these
comparisons are based on very few observations. Nevertheless, we find no significant treatment differences in the level of investment for any signal profile
(p > 0.1 in all comparisons), while we do find significant differences in the within-group variability (p = 0.0087 in the case of one good signal and p = 0.0598 in
the case of two good signals).
Table 3
Stage IV investment decisions.
Number of good signals Average Mean absolute deviation
COMM NO-COMM COMM NO-COMM
0 0.89 0.79 0.59 0.91
(n = 6) (n = 13) (n = 6) (n = 13)
1 2.00 2.17 0.79 0.96
(n = 9) (n = 6) (n = 9) (n = 6)
2 2.83 3.67 1.13 0.96
(n = 8) (n = 10) (n = 8) (n = 10)
3 5.58 4.67 1.16 2.88
(n = 4) (n = 1) (n = 4) (n = 1)
Table 4
Proportion of variability in investments explained by group dummies.
Number of good signals COMM NO-COMM
Stage III Stage IV Stage III Stage IV
0 74*** 44 25 21
1 95*** 54** 31 49
2 70*** 60** 36 42
3 91*** 70** n.a. n.a.
⁄ Asterisks denote significance at the 10% level based on F-tests of joint significance of group dummies.
** Asterisks denote significance at the 5% level based on F-tests of joint significance of group dummies.
*** Asterisks denote significance at the 1% level based on F-tests of joint significance of group dummies.
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fellow group members that a particular decision is preferable then we would expect subjects to choose similar levels of
risk-taking in stages III and IV.
Before comparing stages, we first present investment decisions from stage IV in Table 3. Analogously to Table 2, we pre-
sent average investments and the average within-group variability of investments across groups with a given signal profile.12
As with stage III, investment levels are not significantly different across treatments (two-tailed Mann–Whitney U tests, p > 0.1
for all signal profiles). In contrast to stage III however, we find no treatment effect with regard to within-group variability
(p > 0.1 for all signal profiles).
For comparing Tables 2 and 3 we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests taking the group change across stages III and IV as the
unit of analysis, pooling across signal profiles. We find no significant differences in average investments (p = 0.6068 for
COMM; p = 0.6036 for NO-COMM), or in within-group variability in the NO-COMM treatment (p = 0.4601). However there
is a significant increase in within-group variability in the COMM treatment (p = 0.0002).
The significant increase in within-group variability from stage III to IV of the COMM treatment is accompanied by a reduc-
tion in the amount of ‘‘consensus”. We find only one of 27 groups made identical choices. Thus while in stage III many sub-
jects chose to enter the same decision as that of fellow group members, once they reached stage IV they tended to ‘‘do their
own thing”. This suggests that at least part of the consensus in stage III was due to social preferences over risk.
In order to examine whether there is any influence of the stage III group interaction on decisions we regressed investment
decisions on group dummies for each signal profile. The R2 statistics from these regressions are presented in Table 4. Note
that in the NO-COMM treatment the dummy variables are insignificant. In the COMM treatments the group dummies are
highly significant in stage III, reflecting that the variability of individuals’ investment choices about group means is substan-
tially lower than the variability about the overall mean. In stage IV the explanatory power of the group dummies is reduced,
but not eliminated. Thus, even though the incidence of consensus is reduced subject choices within groups are highly
correlated, offering support for the persuasive arguments mechanism. Group communication has a lasting impact on
individuals’ investment choices.
5. Conclusion
We report the results of an experiment designed to help understand how groups aggregate information that is relevant
for decision-making in risky environments. In our experiment subjects receive information from two sources: from observ-12 To be clear, subjects are making individual decisions in stage IV without any group interaction, but we measure variability relative to the stage III grouping
structure for comparison with stage III.
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bers to either freely communicate or restricting them to simple direct reports of information.
Our analysis of the experimental results produces two main findings. First, while the behavior of many subjects is con-
sistent with Bayesian rationality, a considerable number of subjects exhibited ‘reverse confirmation bias’. That is, they seem
to place less weight on information from others that agrees with their private signal and more weight on conflicting infor-
mation. We find that this tendency is particularly pronounced when subjects communicate freely. When subjects cannot
communicate freely, the incidence of reverse confirmation bias reduces to the same level as confirmation bias. As far as
we are aware this phenomenon has not been documented before. There are different ways of interpreting the change of
investment away from one’s private signal after talking to others. One explanation is that the subject somehow places more
weight on the signal different from her own after a group discussion. This could be driven by a probability heuristic acquired
in the group discussion or by the verbal report of a signal contradicting one’s own coming across as more credible. An
alternative explanation is that the subject has become convinced, in the course of the discussion with others, that she has
overweighted her own signal in her stage II decision. Distinguishing between competing explanations is an interesting topic
for further research.
Second, when subjects can communicate freely we observe a striking degree of consensus: in most groups all members
make the same choice. The pattern of choices across different stages of the experiment suggests that the high degree of group
consensus is partly due to persuasive arguments of other group members and partly due to social preferences over risk.
Altogether, our results indicate a remarkably high level of trust in the information and opinions communicated by others.
The high level of trust placed in others may reflect certain features of our experimental design. Because our subjects have no
experience with the experimental task we use, and all subjects receive the same outcome in stage III, there appears to be
little incentive to act strategically. Perhaps if subjects would receive different outcomes (e.g. a smaller or greater part of their
earnings was determined by the state of the world), or if subjects would play multiple rounds of the game with feedback,
they would be tempted to misreport their private information and be less inclined to agree with others. Furthermore, the
process of obtaining private information in our experiment was entirely transparent – if it was less clear where others’
information came from, subjects might have been more suspicious. Varying the degree of pay-off commonality and the
(perceived) quality of private information also seem promising directions for further research.Acknowledgements
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Appendix A. Experimental instructions
N.B.: Introductory instructions and instructions for Stages I, II and IV are identical across treatments, whereas stage III
instructions differ and are printed separately per treatment.
A.1. Introduction (both treatments)
Welcome to our experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 45 min. The instructions for the
experiment are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. The money you earn
will be paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after the experiment. You are not allowed to talk to other subjects
during the experiment, and you are not allowed to look at any computer screen but your own; anyone who is found breaking
these rules will be dismissed without payment.
The experiment consists of four stages. In each of the four stages, we will ask you to submit a decision. Your earnings will
depend on your decision in only ONE of the four stages; the decisions in the other three stages will not affect your earnings.
The experimenter will now randomly determine the stage that will count for your earnings. We have four playing cards: the
ace, 2, 3 and 4 of spades – these represent the four stages of the experiment. [Experimenter shows cards to subjects.] We will
shuffle them and one will be picked at random. The selected card will go back in the box and will remain here until the end of
the experiment. [Randomly chosen subject blindly picks playing card in front of other subjects.] You will not know which
one of the stages will count until the end. You should therefore consider your decision carefully in every stage, since, as
far as you can tell, any stage could be the one that counts for your earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions
during the experiment. An experimenter will then come to you and privately answer your question.
Your earnings from the experiment depend on your decisions, and which of two card sets is randomly selected by the
experimenter. The two sets are pictured on the whiteboard. As you can see, set A contains 2 red cards and 1 black card;
set B contains 2 black cards and 1 red card. The experimenter will now select the set of cards; this selection will be relevant
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experiment. [Show card sets to subjects.] We will now put each of them in a box, and put these boxes in a bag. We will now
shuffle them, and pick one of the sets at random. [Randomly chosen subject blindly picks box with card set in front of other
subjects.]
A.2. Stage I (both treatments)
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on your choice and whether
card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’
button.
You will have 5 min to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid
according to the decision you are about to make. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
A.3. Stage II (both treatments)
Each person will now privately receive a clue about which card set has been selected. We will do this by letting you draw
a card from the selected set, allowing you to see if its red or black, then putting it back in the set before the next person draws
a card. Your clue is private in the sense that only you observe it. Other subjects cannot see the card you draw. Please note that
we will ask you to input your clue on the computer screen immediately after your draw.
We will now go around and give each of you your private clue. Please keep your eyes in your own cubicle and wait until
the experimenter comes to you, draw a card from the set, look at it, then input it on your screen. You are not allowed to
observe other people’s clues.
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on your choice and whether
card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’
button.
You will have 5 min to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid
according to the decision you are about to make. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
A.4. Stage III (treatment COMM)
In this stage you will be randomly matched with two other subjects to form a group of three. Before you make any deci-
sion, you will get 5 min to communicate with your fellow group members through a chat box on your screen. You are free to
discuss any aspect of the experiment that you wish, as long as you follow these rules:
 You must not reveal any personal information (for example, your name, contact details or seat in the room).
 You must not make any threats, insults or use otherwise offensive language.
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited.
After the chat you must choose one of the 11 options from the table below (which will be displayed on your screen during
the chat). One of the three decisions in your group will be randomly selected and all groupmembers will be paid according to
this decision. This means that each member of your group will earn the same amount. At the end of this stage, you will be
informed of each group member’s decision and which one of the three group members’ decisions has been selected.
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. The earnings of each member of your group will depend
on which of the three group members’ choices will be selected and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You
make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You will have 5 min to make a decision.
Please raise your hand if you have a question.
One of the group members’ choices will be randomly selected and implemented for the entire group. Keep in mind that, if
this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the selected decision.
A.5. Stage III (treatment NO-COMM)
In this stage you will be randomly matched with two other subjects to form a group of three. You can report your clue to
your fellow group members (we will ask you to choose one of the alternatives on your screen). Before you make a decision in
this stage, you will see the clues reported by yourself and the two other members of your group.
After seeing the clues reported by you and your fellow group members you must choose one of the 11 options from the
table below (which will be displayed on your screen). One of the three decisions in your group will be randomly selected and
all group members will be paid according to this decision. This means that each member of your group will earn the same
amount. At the end of this stage, you will be informed of each group member’s decision and which one of the three group
members’ decisions has been selected.
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below (options are the same as in the previous stages). The
earnings of each member of your group will depend on which of the three group members’ choices will be selected and
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decision’ button. You will have 5 min to make a decision. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
One of the group members’ choices will be randomly selected and implemented for the entire group. Keep in mind that, if
this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to make.
A.6. Stage IV (both treatments)
In this part of the experiment, you must make another decision, this time individually. You must choose one of the 11
options in the table shown below. Your earnings will depend on your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been
selected. You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You will have 5 min to
make a decision.
Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to
make. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
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